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Life is a concept that is commonly encountered in ethnographic literature. Most social 
anthropologists seem happy to live with a broadly uncritical approach to it. In recent years, 
however, it has come to our notice that if we truly aim to take on interdisciplinarity in any 
serious way, we cannot avoid dealing with life as an analytical tool. In this essay, I examine 
the notion of life in light of ethnographic theory. I outline three broad families of meaning of 
the category ÒlifeÓ as it appears in the ethnographic register. Taking recourse to Marilyn 
StrathernÕs inspiration, I conclude that these meanings can be integrated if we see them in 
terms of Òscale.Ó 
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Was there ever a time when anthropologists did not speak of life? Over the past few years, 
some of us have been increasingly concerned to understand the role ÒlifeÓ plays in our 
theoretical undertakings (e.g., Toren 2012). In particular, it has come to our notice that, if we 
truly aim to take on interdisciplinarity in a serious way, we cannot avoid having to deal with 
life as an analytical tool (e.g., Thompson 2007). How else can we hope to reach across Òthe 
opposition of physis and nomos, nature and law (or nature and convention) that has been 
inscribed in Western ontology since it was elaborated by Greek sophists in the fifth century 
BCÓ (Sahlins 2011: 7)? 
As human lives are part of the greater process of life, our ethnographies cannot afford 
to be exclusively placed within the realm of nomos. As Vicki Kirby puts it, Òour corporeal 
realities and their productive iterations are material reinventions. Life reads and rewrites 
itself, and this operation of universal genesis and reproduction is even internal to the tiny 
marks on this page, which are effective transubstantiationsÓ (2011: 1). Since the days when 
Arthur Maurice Hocart wrote his essay on ÒThe lifegiving mythÓ ([1952] 2004: 9Ð27), we 
have known that sociality is both part of life and actively mobilises life. This applies both in 
organismic lifeÑwhere, for example, the very atmosphere that we breathe was the product of 
cyanobacteriaÑand in human lifeÑwhere our physical survival is assured by food, cover, 
and safety that only sociality affords. As Tim Ingold put it, Òthis life-process is also the 
process of formation of the landscapes in which people have livedÓ (1993: 152). 
In the pages that follow, I examine the notion of life in light of ethnographic theory. I 
must start, however, with an initial note of caution: mine is not an argument in favor of 
biological reductionism. Rather, it is a call to an anthropological outlook that reaches across 
the biological/cultural divide. This, too, is nothing new in our canonical texts. Let me give 
you a random example of how such a broad conception of life has always been implicit in the 
analytical tool box of social scientists. This is how Robert ParkÑthe apical ancestor of all 
urban studiesÑdefines city in 1925: ÒThe city is . . . a state of mind,Ó it is not Òmerely a 
physical mechanism and an artificial construction. It is involved in the vital processes of the 
people who compose it; it is a product of nature, and particularly of human natureÓ (1925: 1; 
my emphasis). Much water has passed under the theoretical bridge since the days of Park and 
Hocart, but their insights into the centrality of life in human sociality remain deeply relevant 
today. More recently, Fiona Bowie echoes their insights when she claims that a concern with 
Òlife forceÓ is at the root of all phenomena that we call witchcraft (2000: 219). 
The meaning of life 
For a biologist, the meaning of life is a central and never postponed issue. Most social 
scientists, however, seem happy to live with a broadly uncritical approach to life, as if they 
were bashful concerning the expression in face of the famous comical take by Monty Python 
(Jones 1983). Not only do we fail to connect to biological approaches to life but also we are 
often uncertain as to whether the term bears any specific analytical significance for our 
purposes. 
Recently, while discussing with Federico Neiburg his work on Haiti, he called my 
attention to the central significance in the local worldview of the expression chache lavi 
(making a living for oneself), where the implication of fate or destiny and the sense of 
struggle are strongly present. The concept of lavi, he sustains, is central to an understanding 
of economic activity in HaitiÕs challenging circumstances. In fact, the concept has a familiar 
ring about it; most experienced ethnographers, I am sure, will find echoes of their own work 
in HaitiÕs lavi. One is legitimately led to ask: How does this meaning of lifeÑimplying 
struggle and fateÑrelate to the broader biological meaning of life as appertaining to entities 
that are capable of growing, metabolizing, responding to stimuli, and reproducing? Are the 
two meanings at all related to each other? The matter hardly stops there. Life as an analytical 
category has an important and consolidated role in the history of ethnography to refer to what 
Ludwig Wittgenstein called Òa form of lifeÓ ([1953] 1967, II, xi: 226; ¤432: 128). It is best 
typified by the meaning of the word as used in such classics as Henri-Alexandre JunodÕs The 
life of a South African tribe ([1926Ð27] 1962), Melville HerskovitsÕs Life in a Haitian valley 
([1937] 2007), or Oscar LewisÕ Life in a Mexican village: Tepoztln restudied (1951). 
In the case of humans, this meaning of the word might be succinctly described as 
peopleÕs effortful confrontation with a habitus (cf. Mauss [1935] 2007). Indeed, the tradition 
of ethnographic studies to which I am referring here (as typified by Junod, Arnold van 
Gennep, Lewis, or Robert Redfield) is held together by the way in which it values the 
purposive struggle on the part of the members of the group being studied to engage with 
historically rooted patterns of behavior. Life in this sense does not properly refer to a 
metabolic process but rather to a distinctive tradition of organizing collectively the 
sustainability of singular living organismsÑand that is why social situations of Òlimit,Ó 
where metabolic life and fertility are threatened (as typically is the case in LewisÕs works) are 
a central concern of this ethnographic tradition. In fact, such studies are often structured 
rhetorically around a notion of the Òlife-courseÓ of persons. 
One cannot write ethnography at all without recourse to analytical categories. 
Similarly, one cannot hope to understand how those analytical categories are related to the 
local instances of communication observed in ethnographic research without making a 
reference to a lived world also experienced by the ethnographer. We might satisfy ourselves 
with a culturalist response to this question by claiming that we should not confuse the emic 
with the etic meanings of the expressions. Such a position holds that ethnographic theory 
must limit itself to clarifying the meaning of concepts in each particular instance of usage. Of 
course, we agree that ethnographers must do thatÑfor that is the allotted task of 
ethnographyÑbut is it possible to do only that? It is not! Translation depends foundationally 
on a triangulation with world, as Donald Davidson has shown (2004; see Pina-Cabral 1993). 
How can I, then, approach the meaning that something has for someone else if I do not 
triangulate it with a shared world? How else can I move beyond interpersonal indeterminacy? 
Ethnography as a method of evidence gatheringÑparticularly when it involves participant 
observationÑis precisely justified by the possibility of triangulating with experiential 
presence. The intersubjective relations between the ethnographer and her respondents always 
occur somewhere in the world and always involve at least one living being: the ethnographer. 
Three questions arise, therefore. First, is the emphasis on life common to world 
ethnography? Second, if the answer is positive, what life are we talking about? Third, are the 
ethnographers and their readers not necessarily alive? 
Let us remember HocartÕs famous dictum: 
Long ago [man] ceased merely to live, and began to think how he lived; he ceased 
merely to feel life; he conceived it. Out of all phenomena contributing to life he 
formed a concept of life, fertility, prosperity, vitality. He realised that there was 
something which distinguished the animate from the inanimate, and this something he 
called life. ([1936] 1979: 32) 
Back in 1986, when I published my monograph on the worldview of the rural 
population of the Alto Minho (see Pina-Cabral 1986: 1), I was struck by how true this 
appreciation was about my own ethnographic material and I placed it as the epigraph to the 
whole book. I saw that once I identified the deep currents running within the habitus of the 
people I studied in upland Minho (northwest Portugal), the importance of a sense of Òlife, 
fertility, prosperity, vitalityÓ was undeniably one of the central structuring elements. Back 
then, I used RedfieldÕs notion of the Òview of the good lifeÓ as the mode of referring to it 
([1954] 2011). 
Note how, in the above assessment, Hocart not only conjoins the various meanings of 
life but also rejects radically the etic/emic distinctionÑindeed, as many of us do today due to 
our explicitly antirepresentationalist stance (cf. Pina-Cabral 2017: 124). He suggests that the 
continuity that he draws between the different meanings of life is not only a characteristic of 
the analytical category of life that he proposes, but is also a stochastic recurrence among the 
various instances of use of proximate concepts that we encounter in the ethnographic and 
historical literature. 
The need to be able to capture the sense of continuity that ethnography suggests 
between these different definitions of life is an old problem of ethnographic theory. In his 
famous attempt at solving the problem via his Òtheory of needs,Ó Bronis!aw Malinowski was 
inspired by AristotleÕs theory of economics ([1944] 2002: 85ff.). Although his attempt 
remains as unsatisfactory today as it was when he first proposed it, in truth, a better answer 
has taken a long time to emerge. Most twentieth-century anthropologists settled willingly for 
a condition in which there was a vast black box between ÒmeaningÓ and ÒlifeÓÑyet another 
manifestation of the physis/nomos background assumption. Sociocultural anthropologists, on 
the whole, preferred not to concern themselves with biological life, as it seemed to them too 
distant from the propositional formulations that characterize peopleÕs fateful struggle for life, 
chache lavi, or Òthe life of the people of TepoztlnÓÑand that is what they saw as their 
dedicated subject matter. 
This condition reproduces the doubts raised recently by some of my Facebook 
interlocutors, for whom the rooting of personhood in the biological process of life that I 
propose in World (2017) is a source of puzzlement. In one of his recent Facebook aphorisms, 
Marshall Sahlins comments: ÒYou can step into the same river twice if you just give it a 
name. The true essentialists are symbol-plying humans who assemble differences into 
similaritiesÑidentities and categoriesÑby the selective valuation of co-existing 
resemblances. Ever-changing reality is a nice place to visit, philosophically, but no one ever 
lived thereÓ (Sahlins 2017b). Note how, at the end of the sentence, he equates living with 
meaning, as if each one of us who is alive and capable of thinking propositionally about our 
life were capable of encompassing conceptually all that occurs to us as live beings. 
Sahlins is being provocative and we cannot take his aphorism as anything but an 
encouragement to question our background assumptions; otherwise, this would be a puzzling 
declaration on the part of someone who continues to consider himself a Òhistorical 
materialist.Ó Of course, we all know that the social life of humans who are endowed with 
propositional thinking depends on a series of reifications that come to acquire a relative fixity 
over time, forming what anthropologists call Òa culture.Ó Is there anyone who has any doubts 
concerning that? But if that were all, then we would utterly fail to explain the processuality of 
history; we would be obliged to reject indeterminacy (as indeed Sahlins suggests we might 
have to do in a subsequent Facebook message). We would end up in a world of empty 
structures, a circular world of lifeless meanings. 
To the contrary, as Donald Davidson stresses (2014), communication is not carried 
out in spite of indeterminacy and underdetermination; rather, these are conditions for 
communication. StochasticismÑto use Gregory BatesonÕs preferred expressionÑthat is, Òa 
sequence of events that combines a random component with a selective process so that only 
certain outcomes of the random are allowed to endureÓ (1979: 245)Ñis the only mode 
through which meaning can be constituted both for life in the broader organic sense and for 
life in the other two senses outlined above. In conclusion, as suggested by Hocart, life as an 
analytical category must be able to capture the continuity between the different senses of life 
that we encounter in the ethnographic literature. 
In any case, we are encouraged in doing this by Edmund HusserlÕs own notion of 
lebenswelt (lifeworld), which he conceived, some commentators claim, precisely in order to 
clarify the fact that the experiential world is a world of organic living. Husserl specifies: 
The life-world, for us who wakingly live in it, is always there, existing in advance for 
us, the ÒgroundÓ of all praxis, whether theoretical or extratheoretical. The world is 
pregiven to us, the waking, always somehow practically interested subjects, not 
occasionally but always and necessarily as the universal field of all actual and 
possible praxis, as horizon. To live is always to live-in-certainty-of-the-world. (from 
HusserlÕs Crisis ¤37, quoted in F¿llesdal 2010: 40) 
In other words, life in the biological sense is always the background upon which all 
human life in all other senses can be constituted. Contrary to SahlinsÕs aphorism, we cannot 
ever step into the same river twice because our capacities at concept creation are rooted in the 
processes of communication that characterize human sociality and these, in turn, are based on 
lifeÕs intentionalityÑthat is, our capacity to address the world purposefully. We always Òlive-
in-certainty-of-the-world.Ó 
In short, therefore, in ethnographic theory, we are bound to treat the analytical 
category life as a continuum, in the way Hocart suggests in the quote above. However, unlike 
other living beings, human persons are not only engaged in intentionality but also in 
propositional reflexive thinking. This necessarily involves them in distinct modes of 
approaching life and their own condition as living organismsÑin human sociality, biological 
life becomes chache lavi. 
In early ontogeny, when they enter into human modes of communication (thus 
becoming a person), humans become capable of symbolic manipulation of the worldÑas 
Hocart put it, they Òcease merely to live, and begin to think how they live; they cease merely 
to feel life; they conceive it.Ó Persons transcend (see Pina-Cabral 2017: 31Ð72)Ñbut who are 
the agents of transcendence? The answer surely is HusserlÕs: persons-who-wakingly-live-in-
the-world. Odd as it may sound, persons transcend; not gods, ancestors, or ghosts. We must 
distinguish living persons from the other hypostatizations of personhood that characterize 
human sociality and that are made possible due to what Charles Sanders Peirce called 
symbolic thinking (Short 2007). So the matter of Òanimism,Ó that which Sahlins calls 
ÒmetapersonsÓ (2017a)Ñthat is, entities to which personhood is attributed but that are not 
living humans, such as mountains, souls, divinities, sacred animals, ancestors, etc.Ñis 
certainly relevant. It is, however, important to realize that human persons (persons-who-
wakingly-live-in-the-world) are a condition for the existence of metapersons, not the other 
way around; thus, for humans, life in its broader continuity is never separable from chache 
lavi. 
This is a matter of great relevance to ethnographic theory. Ethnographers are duty 
bound to develop analytical referents to allow for ethnographic comparison and, in time, 
contribute toward anthropological theory. But they can only undertake that role because they 
themselves are persons-who-wakingly-live-in-the-world; sacred mountains, sacred 
crocodiles, divinities, or ancestors are not ethnographers. Some engagement with life in all of 
its diverging meanings is a condition for the practice of ethnography, not only because 
without living-ethnographers ethnography could not be written but also because the complex 
continuity between the different meanings of life is necessarily part of what the ethnographer 
will have to capture in his writings, as Hocart clearly perceived and our contemporary 
colleagues corroborate. Life, therefore, presents itself to the ethnographer as a matter of 
scales; differentiated but interdependent strata of life. I propose here, therefore, to outline 
three broad families of meaning of the category life that unavoidably constitute bays for 
ethnographic description. Let us distinguish them as life1, life2, and life3. 
Three scales of living 
Life1 is the life of organismsÑthat is, the process of self-organization of systems that 
maintain their sensory states within physiological bounds. This, however, assumes 
communication. This is how Maurice Merleau-Ponty expresses the idea: ÒThe phenomenon 
of life appeared . . . at the moment when a piece of extension, by the disposition of its 
movements and by the allusion that each movement makes to all the others, turned back upon 
itself and began to express something, to manifest an interior being externallyÓ ([1942] 1963: 
163). Whether biological self-organization emerges spontaneously as the inevitable product 
of the interrelation between bounded systems, as presently seems most likely (Friston 2013), 
or lifeÕs purposiveness has another origin (e.g., KirbyÕs quantum anthropology [2011] or 
Andy ProssÕs chemical account [2012]), it remains clear that biological life is a characteristic 
of systems that are (a) bounded, (b) internally differentiated, and (c) autopoietic in the sense 
of engaged in dynamic adjustment to their environment (see Thompson 2007). 
Life2 is the life of socialityÑit refers to the way in which life1 gives rise to Òforms of 
life.Ó Like life1, life2 is also characterized by boundedness and is also engaged in a dynamic 
relation with the environment. There is in it a deep element of purposiveness, in the sense 
that it involves a constant attempt at the maximization of lifeÑno longer at the level of the 
organism but rather of the group. The collective element is central to this acceptation. Life2 is 
not restricted to humans: bees, birds, fish, and mammals have Òforms of lifeÓ that are clearly 
identifiable. It makes sense to speak of the Òlife of sparrowsÓ or Òthe life of beesÓ in the same 
way that it makes sense to speak of Òthe life of TepoztlnÓ or Òthe life of a South African 
tribe.Ó 
When we speak of life in this second acceptation, we are not primarily referring to 
specific gestures undertaken by living organisms (although that is surely part of it) but to 
collective modes of doing, to a habitus, to stochastically emergent properties inherent in a 
certain social environment. This shared purposiveness is the ground upon which kinship is 
built: as Sahlins himself puts it, Òkinsmen are persons who belong to one another, who are 
members of one another, who are co-present in each other, whose lives are joined and 
interdependentÓ (2011: 11; my emphasis). This typically involves a sense of embodied 
cosustenance. What Peter Gow states of the Piro is indeed true across most of the 
ethnographic record: ÒNative communities focus on the relationships in which food is 
produced, circulated, and consumed, such that for native people, to live with kin is life itselfÓ 
(1991: 119). There is a collectivist implication to this second meaning of life, therefore, but 
one that always depends on a focus on the intentional efforts of the singular living organisms 
that remain alive (be they animals or persons). 
This sense of life, however, is breached by a major line of differentiation. While bees 
and birds engage intentionally with world, they do not possess propositional, reflexive 
thinking; only humans who have become persons (persons-who-wakingly-live-in-the-world) 
possess it. Persons hypostatize their own forms of life and, thus, they can symbolically 
manipulate them and treat them as objects of contemplation and of fabrication. Persons do 
not only live, they conceive life, as Hocart prophetically stated. Thus, in the case of humans, 
life2 assumes a ÒricherÓ form of purposiveness than it does with other animalsÑto use Martin 
HeideggerÕs terms (cf. [1929Ð30] 1995). Typically, it assumes forms of purposiveness that 
are dependent on the way in which persons, when they become persons, become capable of 
transcendence; that is, they become capable of seeing the world as if they were outside of it. 
This means that human sociality is deeply inscribed by the metapersons (see Sahlins 2017a) 
that humans postulate and reproduce and that, in turn, come to affect the persons-who-
wakingly-live-in-the-world that are a condition for the existence of metapersons. No person 
ever was the first-person. The habitus is a central aspect of personal constitution (see Pina-
Cabral 2007: 99Ð134), which means that transcendence is as much a product as a condition of 
personhoodÑmuch like oxygen is both a product and a condition of most forms of life. 
Therefore, animismÑin the sense of a propensity to hypostatize metapersonsÑis a function 
of personhood, not some primitivist trait (see Pina-Cabral forthcoming). 
Life3 is the use of life that concerns Federico Neiburg when he queries the 
implications of the Haitian expression chache laviÑthe Portuguese fazer-se  vida or the 
English making a living would constitute similarly related examples. This third meaning must 
be differentiated from the earlier two, for it involves a repeated symbolic (propositional) 
engagement with the world in the face of incompleteness. Chache lavi is not only about 
managing to eat, dwell, and reproduce, it is also about having an honorable life, being a 
moral person, aiming at Òthe good life.Ó Curiously, the sense of singularity that was 
characteristic of life1 but not life2 is again a feature of this third acceptation of life. 
ÒMaking a living,Ó as exemplified in the eponymous first film of Charlie Chaplin 
(Lehrman 1914), is something of a personal pursuit and it has to do with the personÕs own 
sense of moral sustainability in the face of the need to thrive. ChaplinÕs tramp perfectly 
exemplifies the pathos that is involved in the ultimate incapacity to achieve Òthe good lifeÓ in 
spite of the constant efforts to achieve it. Life3 is the life of destiny in that it involves the 
impossibility of complete transcendence. 
The three distinct meanings of life that we encounter in the ethnographic record were 
treated here as Òscales.Ó Therefore, let us at this point focus briefly on the meaning of scale 
by taking Marilyn StrathernÕs inspiration (2005). According to her, a ÒscaleÓ involves 
Òswitching from one perspective on a phenomenon to another, as anthropologists routinely do 
in the organising of their materialsÓ (2005: xiv). The notion of scale implies relative distance 
to the objectÑthat is, relative separation. Therefore, it assumes the existence of separable 
entitiesÑa feature of lifeÕs intentionality, the capacity to address the world by relation to a 
part of that world (see Hutto and Myin 2013). This is how Strathern puts it: scale Òis made 
possible by a modelling of nature that regards the world as naturally composed of entitiesÑa 
multiplicity of individuals or classes or relationshipsÑwhose characteristics are in turn 
regarded as only ever partially described by analytic schemaÓ (Strathern 2005: xiv). 
What is at stake here is not the mere sideways shifting of position, as it were. 
ÒPerspectiveÓ refers here to Òthe cultural practice of position-takingÓ (Strathern 2005: 
121n2). As Strathern goes on to explain, Òthe idea of perspective suggests one will encounter 
whole fresh sets of information as one moves through various scalesÑfrom organism to cell 
to atomic particle, from society to group to individualÓ (2005: xix). This latter part of the 
sentence smuggles in a central aspect of StrathernÕs cosmovision that we cannot fail to 
highlight. See how she classifies the scales: namely, the way she breaks them into the two 
parallel series (organism / cell / atomic particle // society / group / individual). 
The identification of persons with atomic particles involves a major conceptual shift 
that demands expression by the breaking of the series. As it happens, persons are not atomic 
particles: they are organisms. Clearly, what does separate the two modalities of scalingÑ
creating at a higher level yet another scale effectÑis personal emergence: the fact that, in 
human sociality, organisms are constituted as persons endowed with propositional thinking. 
That way, they constitute a new scale of life. We may conclude with Strathern, therefore, that 
after the emergence of the organism that the intentionality of life implies, the emergence of 
the person is the single most important perspectival shift in the world of humans. 
Metaphysical pluralism 
Personal ontogenyÑthe constitution of persons who are capable of transcending their 
organismic conditionÑis the unique characteristic of human life. Faced with other living 
beings, transcendence is the privilege of persons; it is what allows us to see the world as 
creation, a world that includes us (see Pina-Cabral 2017). Yet, although persons transcend, 
they can only do so partially. Persons (whether ethnographers or not) remain bound to life 
both in the organic and in the collective sense and, to that extent, they are bound by a 
condition that presents itself as a fatality, a loss of freedom. None of the three scales of life 
suffices, either for the ethnographic task or for the experience of life itself, in as much as they 
interact as scales in the experience of any person-who-wakingly-lives-in-the-world. Life3 is 
dependent on life1 in terms that are constituted inside and outside the person by life2. The 
three scales of life do not simply coexist in personal experience; they are also in constant 
interaction. 
In short, organic survival, habitus, and personal destiny are not only built one on top 
of the other, they interact across scales. Life is complex in that persons inevitably form what 
mathematicians have been calling since the 1980s non-well-founded sets. These are sets that 
contain themselves as members, thus forming an infinite sequence of sets, each term of which 
is an element in the preceding set. Furthermore, this is the very quality that, according to 
Jagdish Hattiangadi, allows for the emergence of entities: ÒThough a whole is always 
composed of its parts, sometimes the types of things that constitute the parts cannot be fully 
described in all causally relevant respects without describing how they interact with the types 
of things that are wholes as wholes that are composed out of themÓ (2005: 89). 
As Strathern has taught us, scales interact through ÒdomainingÓÑthat is, the 
constitution of separate areas of relevanceÑbut also through ÒmagnificationÓÑthat is, the 
increase or reduction of approximation (Strathern 2005: xvi). The complexity resulting from 
this interaction of the scales of life gives rise to a condition that I have called elsewhere 
Òmetaphysical pluralismÓ (2017). That is, while persons transcend, they never do so 
absolutely. This means that all human ontologies will necessarily be both incomplete and 
complex. Therefore, from an ethnographic perspective, the ambivalence of the world that 
Heidegger identified (its uncertainty, its fuzziness, its indeterminacy) cannot and should not 
be resolved by the anthropological endeavor; it must remain with us as a challenge, for it is a 
central conditioning feature of the emergence of persons in the world. 
I conclude with ethnographic theory. No human communication can dispense of its 
historical inherence and it will always involve metaphysical pluralism. In short, no 
anthropological knowledge can rise above the historicity of the ethnographic encounters that 
it depends upon. As Husserl identified, the lifeworld of humans involves necessarily the 
interaction of the three scales of life. And as Hocart identified, ethnography is not only duty 
bound to capture the particular modes of integration of the three, but is not even possible 
without the ethnographerÕs own immersion in life in its three major senses. 
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